Abstract. Rijmen and Preneel recently proposed for the rst time a family of trapdoor block ciphers 8]. In this family of ciphers, a trapdoor is hidden in S-boxes and is claimed to be undetectable in 8] for properly chosen parameters. Given the trapdoor, the secret key (used for encryption and decryption) can be recovered easily by applying Matsui's linear cryptanalysis 6]. In this paper, we break this family of trapdoor block ciphers by d e v eloping an attack on the S-boxes. We s h o w h o w to nd the trapdoor in the S-boxes and demonstrate that it is impossible to adjust the parameters of the S-boxes such that detecting the trapdoor is di cult meanwhile nding the secret key by trapdoor information is easy.
Introduction
In cryptography, design of secure trapdoor one-way functions has long been a challenging problem. Many previous proposals have been broken and the existing "secure" ones are mostly based on the few conjectures of hard problems in numbertheory.
Recently, Rijmen and Preneel proposed a family of trapdoor block ciphers 8] which w e will call RP trapdoor ciphers. In such ciphers, a trapdoor is built into S-boxes. Knowledge of the trapdoor allows one to determine the correlation between output bits of the cipher's round function. This correlation is in turn used to nd the secret key by performing Matsui's linear cryptanalysis on a small amount o f k n o wn plaintexts 6]. In 8] , it was claimed that the trapdoor with properly chosen parameters is undetectable and RP trapdoor ciphers may be used for public key encryption.
In this paper, we break RP trapdoor block ciphers by developing an attack on the trapdoor S-boxes. We rst demonstrate that the trapdoor can be found from the S-boxes. We then show that RP trapdoor block ciphers can not be made secure by adjusting system parameters, since it is not possible for such ciphers to meet the following two c o n tradicting requirements simultaneously: 1) be resistance to our attack and, 2) be computationally e cient in nding the secret key using linear cryptanalysis once the trapdoor is known. This paper is organized as follows. The trapdoor S-boxes and RP trapdoor ciphers are brie y reviewed in Section 2. In Section 3, we present our attack t o RP trapdoor ciphers (more precisely, to the trapdoor S-boxes). In Section 4, we show that it is not possible to construct secure RP trapdoor ciphers by adjusting system parameters. We conclude the paper in Section 5.
RP Trapdoor Ciphers
RP trapdoor ciphers make use of the "type II" linear relations as de ned in 7] : correlations that exist between output bits of a cipher's round function/S-boxes. Knowledge of the trapdoor reveals the correlations and allows linear cryptanalysis being carried out to determine the secret key from some known plaintexts.
Trapdoorm n S-boxes
The trapdoor in RP trapdoor ciphers is built into S-boxes. An m n S-box h a s m-dimensional and n-dimensional Boolean vectors as its inputs and outputs, respectively. It can be represented by 2 m n-dimensional Boolean vectors, i.e., 
holds with probability p T (which has a value very close to 1). Equation where K i is the ith round subkey and F is the round function. Note that after the last round, the swapping of the halves is undone to make encryption and decryption similar.
In 8], variants on both CAST 5] and LOKI91 3] w ere studied. In this paper, we only consider trapdoor CAST ciphers since all the discussions here can be extended to trapdoor LOKI91 ciphers directly.
The CAST family of ciphers are 64-bit Feistel ciphers. Its round function F is based on four 8 32 S-boxes (i.e., for m = 8 n = 32), which h a ve components that are either randomly ch o s e n o r a r e b e n t functions 1]. Mathematically, t h e round function is given by
where x, the 32-bit input, is the concatenation of 4 bytes x = x 1 jjx 2 jjx 3 jjx 4 and where S 1 : : : S 4 are four 8 32 S-boxes.
In a trapdoor CAST cipher, the four S-boxes use the same trapdoor but possibly with di erent v alues of p T , denoted as p (1) T : : : p (4) T . The following relation holds
Hence the round function correlates with the constant zero function with a correlation equal to
It was stated in 8] that CAST should be extended in a natural way to a 128-bit block cipher by using 8 64 S-boxes. This, it claimed, will make the trapdoor undetectable. Unfortunately, this claim is false as we will show i n t h e next section.
Attack on RP Trapdoor Ciphers
In this section, we show that the trapdoor in a RP trapdoor cipher can be found easily and directly from the S-boxes. RP trapdoor ciphers as described in the last section has l = n m S-boxes, each consisting of 2 m n-dimensional Boolean vectors. By way of their construction as presented in Section 2.1, we know t h a t v ectors in S-boxes are randomly chosen therefore, the total number of distinguishing vectors in the l S-boxes, denoted by N, should be very close to l2 m . W e also know e a c h S -b o x is associated with a probability p 
The following algorithm is used to determine the trapdoor directly from the l S-boxes. Algorithm 1.
Step 1. C h o o s e n vectors, denoted as v i1 v i2 v in , randomly from v 1 v 2 v N .
Step 2. S o l v e the n equations for x : v i k x = 0 for k = 1 2 : : : n
Step 3. If non-zero solutions do not exist, go to Step 1. If solutions, say 1 2 : : : t , are found, check whether they satisfy (2) . If some j does satisfy (2), then it is the trapdoor we are looking for otherwise, go to Step 1.
Observations 1. If we happen to choose v i1 v i2
v in in Step 1 s u c h that v i k = 0 h a s non-zero solutions for k = 1 2 : : : n , then must be among these solutions.
By checking them one by one against (2), we can nd this . 2. If we can nd another 0 (6 = ) also satisfying (2), this 0 can also be used as trapdoor information in linear attack for nding the secret key.
3. Since v i = 0 with probability p T , such \lucky choice" happens with probability about (p T ) n . Hence, it is guaranteed to nd a trapdoor with this probability. (The probability in fact should be C n N p T =C n N . This number is very close to (p T ) n when N is much larger than n and p T is close to 1. Here C n N denotes the numberofways of choosing n objects from N objects.)
4. The number of solutions t won't be very large. This is because the vectors of the S-boxes are randomly chosen except for one bit(at bit position q), therefore, the rank of the matrix in (2) is close to n with large probability. Now let's look at a trapdoor CAST cipher with 128-bit block s i z e ( n = 64) and p T = 1 ; 2 ;5 (this value of p T was given in 8] as an example to illustrate the strength of the RP trapdoor cipher). The value of (p T ) n is about 0.1311. By repeating Steps 1 and 2 of the algorithm 32 times, we expect to get the value of with probability 98.89%. This example shows clearly that RP trapdoor block ciphers are very vulnerable under our attack. 4 The Impossibility of Designing Secure RP Trapdoor Ciphers
In Section 3, we developed an attack to RP trapdoor ciphers. We demonstrated that the trapdoor can be determined easily from S-boxes. In this section, we show that it is impossible to design secure practical RP trapdoor ciphers.
We observe that there is a tradeo between resisting our attack (i.e., Algorithm 1) and the e ort required to nd the secret key from trapdoor using linear cryptanalysis. This tradeo can be adjusted by selecting system parameters r (number of rounds), m n, and p T . The smaller (p T ; 0:5) is, the more di cult it is to succeed in Algorithm 1, but at the same time, the more di cult it is to nd the secret key from the given trapdoor using linear cryptanalysis. Also, large values of m and n increases the computational complexity of Algorithm 1 , as well as that of S-boxes. To simplify our notations and without loss of generability, in the following we assume that p To design a practical secure trapdoor cipher, two more requirements must bemet:
Requirement 3. The trapdoor should is secure in the sense that it is hard to nd the trapdoor even if its general form is known.
Requirement 4 . The trapdoor should be practical in the sense that the secret key can be found easily once the trapdoor is given.
We n o w s h o w that it is not possible to design a RP trapdoor cipher to satisfy the above four requirements simultaneously. We do this by showing that if a RP trapdoor cipher meets the rst three requirements, then it can not meet the fourth requirement.
To satisfy the rst requirement, the round number can not be too small. Thus, we expect that r 8 (3) To satisfy the second requirement, the total size of S-boxes is expected to be less than 128 Megabytes (i.e., 2 30 bits). It is the same as to say t h a t n m (n2 m ) 2
(4)
To satisfy the third requirement, we expect the following relation holds:
For a RP trapdoor cipher that satis es conditions (4) , (5) and (6) From table 1 , we see that too many plaintexts are required to carried out the linear cryptanalysis based on knowledge of the trapdoor in order to discover the secret key. Although there may b e some other methods to reduce the amount of known plaintexts (e.g., reducing the round number or increasing the size of S-boxes to a certain value), we believe that the number of known plaintexts required to carry out a successful linear cryptanalysis is still very large. Thus, we are forced to conclude that it is impossible to design practical secure RP trapdoor block ciphers.
Security o f R P t r a p d o o r b l o c k ciphers lies on the undetectability of a trapdoor built into S-boxes. It was claimed in 8] that it is hard to obtain the trapdoor from S-boxes and therefore RP trapdoor ciphers can be used for public key encryption. In this paper, we s h o wed how to break such ciphers by nding the trapdoor directly from S-boxes. We demonstrated our attack to RP trapdoor ciphers based on "type II" linear relations.
In addition to trapdoors based on "type II" linear relations, trapdoors that make use of "type I" linear relations were also proposed in 8]. "Type I" linear relations are de ned in 7] as the correlations between input and output bits of the round function. Unfortunately, this latter type of trapdoors is also vulnerable to our attack.
Other than hiding linear relations, another method proposed in 8] is to hide di erentials into block ciphers in order to make them vulnerable to di erential cryptanalysis 2]. However, construction of this kind of trapdoors was not given in 8] and it seems that hiding di erentials is more di cult than hiding linear relations. So far, trapdoors based on hiding di erentials remains an open problem .
